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Introduction	  
Background	  	  
War has always a negative effect on civilians and civilian objects, regardless 
on whose side they are. There are always civilian losses and damage of 
civilian objects that characterize every armed conflict no matter the duration of 
the conflict. The 5-days war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was no 
exception.   
The reports of Human Rights Watch, the Dutch investigative commission and 
the HALO Trust in cooperation with Norwegian People’s Aid have stated that 
both parties of the conflict - Russia and Georgia have employed cluster 
munitions in and near populated civilian areas as the means of warfare during 
the conflict. Cluster munitions arise many humanitarian problems at the same 
time because of their negative and significant consequences for civilians. The 
consequences are unavoidable not only because of the technical 
characteristics of cluster munitions as a weapon, but also due to diversity and 
combinations of factors that enhance submunitions’ failure rate and thus 
increase the amount of unexploded submunitions duds that become a major 
threat by killing and maiming people long after the conflict has ended. 
Although, the amount of applied cluster munitions and the number of 
casualties they caused for civilians in Georgia was not at the same level as 
during the armed conflicts in Iraq in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006 and in Syria 
2012, the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 rises once 
again the problem of enormous danger for civilian population that employment 
of cluster munitions has.1  
Cluster munitions have become a prohibited mean of warfare only for those 
states that have ratified the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. For states 
that are not even a party to the Convention, cluster munitions’ use is not 
prohibited as such and is regulated by the international customs and rules of 
law of armed conflicts.2 The meaning of examination of each cluster munitions’ 
use in conformity with the law of targeting in case-by-case way is therefore 
significant. 
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 HRW’s report A Dying Practice 2009: 1 
2 Boothby 2009:252 
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Research	  question	  	  	  
The intention of the research is to assess the Russian and Georgian 
employment of cluster munitions as the means of the attacks in and near 
populated civilian areas in Georgia, in conformity with the fundamental 
principles of the law of armed conflicts. 
The hypothesis is that Russian and Georgian attacks with employment of 
cluster munitions as means of such attacks in and near populated areas were 
indiscriminate and disproportionate, and thus violated customary rules of 
targeting and fundamental principles of legal warfare - distinction, 
proportionality, military necessity and humanity. Hence, the employment of 
cluster munitions in and near populated areas was unlawful. 
Hence, the main issue of the research is to prove the illegitimacy of the 
employment of cluster munitions as the means of warfare in and near 
populated civilian areas. Despite the international acknowledgment that 
cluster munitions are presumed indiscriminate and disproportionate because 
they cannot be precisely targeted at a specific military objective, and thus 
cause excessive collateral damage to civilians, states continue to choice them 
as the means of warfare. 
Structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  
Firstly, I will review the law that regulates the conduct of hostilities – the law of 
targeting, the main idea of which to avoid if not possible, diminish human 
suffering. The main idea has been reconstructed into the codification of 
fundamental principles of law of armed conflicts. Principles of distinction, 
proportionality, military necessity and humanity will be reviewed in details. In 
the second chapter the evaluation of cluster munitions character, their 
humanitarian impact and their legal regulation as means of warfare will be 
done. The actual use of cluster munitions by both parties during the conflict 
will be reviewed in form of summary of the main facts that indicate evidence of 
such use, and will come in chapter three. The final chapter will provide the 
legal assessment of the facts of employment of cluster munitions as means of 
attacks in and near populated areas by both parties in compliance with the 
principles and rules of legal warfare. 
Sources	  and	  method	  
	  
The analyze will review the legal sources of the treaty and customary 
international humanitarian law that together assemble four fundamental 
principles that regulate military conduct - military necessity, humanity, 
distinction and proportionality. In addition, the references will be made to other 
legal instruments’ provisions and norms. 
The basis for determination and analyse of facts that demonstrate the use of 
cluster munitions by both parties to the conflict, will be constituted mainly on 
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the official reports of Human Rights Watch, together with the report of the 
Dutch investigative commission and the report of HALO Trust in cooperation 
with Norwegian People's Aid.  
Since there was no opportunity to conduct a field research in the area of the 
conflict directly and because of the past 5 years since the conflict, the 
following reports will be used: the Dutch Report of the Storimans investigative 
mission from 2009, the reports of Human Rights Watch “Up in Flames: 
Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South 
Ossetia”, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia 
in August 2008” and “Meeting the Challenge: Protecting Civilians through the 
Convention on cluster Munitions”, the 2008 HALO Trust report “Georgia. 
Explosive Remnants of War Assessment” as the main sources of the facts. 
The reports were based on first-hand evidence from witnesses and victims 
and the personal observation and documents on the spot.  
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Chapter	  1	  
The	  law	  that	  regulates	  the	  conduct	  of	  hostilities	  	  
International humanitarian law is the effect of centuries of warfare from which 
the rules and customs governing the conduct of hostilities have developed. 
Law of targeting is the core of international humanitarian law. General 
principles of law of targeting can be found in the sources of the law of armed 
conflicts that consist of custom and of treaty law or codified law. Customs are 
generally accepted as law through state practice 3 together with the general 
principles of law that recognized by civilized nations4 and have legal obligation 
for all states, especially for those which are not parties to the treaty law. Thus, 
customary rules are particularly important sources of the law because they 
bind all states regardless whether a particular state is a party to a particular 
treaty or not.5 There is actually little customary law of targeting that has not 
been codified in or drawn from some treaty. 6  
The totality of treaty and customary international law produces four basic 
principles to regulate conduct of hostilities - military necessity, humanity, 
distinction and proportionality. 
 
1.1	  Principle	  of	  military	  necessity	  
 
The core principle within the law of armed conflict is the principle that limits 
methods and means of warfare for parties – principle of military necessity. No 
matter how insistent and important the military circumstance is, only that kind 
of force, which the law permits may be used.7 Traditionally military necessity 
has been seen as permitting “a state involve in an armed conflict to use only 
that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed 
conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the 
conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the 
earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Statut for ICJ art. 38 (1) (b) 
4 ibid art. 38 (1) (c) 
5 Boothby 2009:27 
6 Henderson 2009:28 
7 Boothby 2012:58 
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resources.”8 The similar definition of principle of military necessity can be 
found in 1959 The United States Navy Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare, 
rule 220 as one of the basic principle of the laws of war. 9 
 
Francis Lieber defines in his 1863 Code military necessity as “understood by 
modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which 
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful 
according to the modern law and usages of war.”10 
 
Involvement into an armed conflict has to be justified by state’s goals. The law 
of armed conflict forbids a state to employ force in an armed conflict beyond 
what is necessary for the fulfillment of the goals of that state.11  
 
Law of armed conflicts is always a compromise between military necessity 
and humanitarian requirements, where its rules adhere to both military 
necessity and the dictates of humanity.12 This compromise cannot always 
satisfy humanitarian intentions, but it has the excessive benefit universal 
acceptance by states as law that has to be respected, even in war.13 Thus, 
there must always be a balance between performing military necessity 
through lawful means and methods, and adherence of humanity. This is also 
confirmed is API art. 51 (5) (b) by stating that “an attack that may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects…,which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated” is prohibited.14 
Often when the law of armed conflicts is violated, the party (ies) refers to 
military necessity as a justification for the acts that have been done.15 The 
Hague Regulations art. 23 (g) provides an example of a provision which 
makes exception for military necessity: “It is forbidden … To destroy or seize 
the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.”16 So all the military actions that destruct 
property during wartime is unlawful and thus criminal only when unjustified by 
military necessity.17  
Hence, the principle of military necessity has its essential elements: a) the 
limitations on the methods and means of warfare; b) these limitations are 
binding for all parties through international law; c) loss of life and destruction 
of property must have a definite military advantage; 4) casualties and damage 
must not be disproportionate or superfluous in relation to expected military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 UK Manual 2004:21 
9 USA Navy Manual 1959  
10 Lieber Code 1863 art. 14 
11 Fleck 2008:36 
12 Fleck 2008:37 
13 Solis 2010:258 
14 API art. 51 (5) (b) 
15 Dinstein 2010:6 
16 Hague Convention IV, art. 23 (g) 
17 Dinstein 2010:6 
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advantage.18 Necessity inherently involves into proportionality, rationality and 
humanity in military actions. The question: necessary or unnecessary for what, 
has to be answered before each military action.19 
 
1.2	  Principle	  of	  humanity	  
	  
The principle of humanity is connected to the principle of military necessity 
within a balance. It forbids the infliction of injury, suffering or devastation not 
actually necessary for achievement of legitimate military purposes.20 The 
principle of humanity is based on the rule that once a legitimate military 
purpose has been achieved, the further and more infliction of suffering is 
unnecessary, and thus unlawful.21 Hague Convention IV ar. 23 (e) states that 
it is forbidden “to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering”.22 Thereby the principle restricts the means and 
methods of warfare that can cause unnecessary suffering. 
The principle also justifies the basic immunity for those who do not participate 
in hostilities and so do not make any contribution to military action – civilian 
populations and those combatants that have been wounded, sick, 
shipwrecked or captured, in addition to civilian objects. The APII art. 4 (1) 
states that “all persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities… shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction.”23 Thus, 
the principle requires a human treatment of the protected groups. 
The principle of humanity is reflected in the Martens Clause in the Preamble 
to Hague Convention IV and states that “…the High Contracting Parties deem 
it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted 
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the 
dictates of public conscience.”24 The Martens Clause requires all belligerents 
to consider whether the chosen means and methods of warfare, even if not 
clearly prohibited, are consistent with the principles of humanity.25 The Clause 
is also recalled in art. 1 (2) of API: “…civilians and combatants remain under 
the protection and authority of the principles …of humanity…”26 
In addition, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that the 
parties treat all those who do not directly participate in hostilities humanely.27 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Solf 1986:128 
19 ibid 
20 Boothby 2012:59; UK Manual 2004:23 
21 UK Manual 2004:23 
22 Hague Convention IV 1907 art. 23 (e) 
23 APII art. 4(1) 
24 Hague Convention IV 1907 Preamble 
25 Kolb, Hyde 2008:63 
26 AP I art. 1(2) 
27 Common Article 3 in Gevena Conventions 
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Thereby, the principle of humanity is pervasive by invoking to respect and to 
treat those who do not directly participate in hostilities with humanity, together 
with calling for protect all participants within hostilities from unnecessary 
suffering caused by means and methods of warfare. 
1.3	  Principle	  of	  distinction	  	  
The principle of distinction is fundamental and irreversible principle and is 
stronghold for both customary international law and treaty law of armed 
conflict. It defines the precise edge between those who may be lawfully 
attacked and those who must be protected from the attack. The principle 
contains three aspects: a) the prohibition to attack civilian persons, b) the 
prohibition to attack civilian objects, and c) the prohibition of indiscriminate 
attacks. 
The customary character of the principle of distinction is well-establish and 
recognized since it was stated in the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 that 
proclaimed “that the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.28 
The first rule in ICRC Study is the rule on distinction between civilians and 
combatants and states that “the parties to the conflict must at all times 
distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed 
against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”29 This 
Rule unquestionably represents accepted customary law.30 The same 
principle of distinction applies to attacks on civilian objects. The ICRC Study 
states in its rule 7 that “the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish 
between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed 
against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian 
objects.”31 
Several military manuals demand that a distinction must be made between 
civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, 
and that it is prohibited to direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects.32  
Hence, the customary rules demonstrate the meaning of the principle – even 
in an armed conflict the only lawful military targets are legitimate targets that 
can be attacked. The principle is recalled in another provision with the 
customary status - article 22 of the Hague Regulation, which states that “the 
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”33 
Additional Protocol I reaffirms and clarifies the customary principles that 
prohibit the attacks on civilians and civilian objects, and that requires making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 St. Petersburg Declaration 1868 Preamble 
29 ICRC Study 2004:3 
30 Wilmshurst, Breau 2007:136 
31 ICRC Study 2004:25 
32 ICRC Study 2004:4 
33 Hague Convention IV art. 22 
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distinctions between treatment of combatants and civilians.34 The article 48 of 
API states that “in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the parties to an armed conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives.”35 
Furthermore, the rules of customary law are strengthened in the provisions of 
API, which expound the regulations on attacks and specify the conditions of 
protection of the civilian population. Article 51(2) and (3) states that the civilian 
population shall not be the object of attacks, the main purpose of which are 
the civilian population, unless they take direct part in hostilities. Hence, 
civilians are refrain from having the rights to participate directly in hostilities, 
as only combatants, which are members of the armed forces are permitted to 
do so.36  
1.3.1	  Civilians	  versus	  combatants	  	  
Civilian is defined as any person who does not belong to any armed forces or 
spontaneous armed units, or other members of organized resistance 
movements; thus, any person who is not combatant.37 It must be noted that 
article 50 (3) of API specifies that “the presence within the civilian population 
of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not 
deprive the population of its civilian character.”38 The provision was supported 
in Galic case.39 It strengthens the promotion of protection of civilian and 
civilian population. The term civilian is also defined negatively in the ICRC 
Study: “civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The 
civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.”40 So the definition 
of civilians is customary. Since the definition contents meaning of combatant 
and armed forces it is significant to define this categories as well. 
The fundamental tent of international law is that one party to a conflict 
employs the form of arms against another party to the conflict through its 
armed forces the members of which as a rule have combatant status. This 
means that only parties to a conflict can have armed forces whose members 
are combatants.41 The legal definition of combatant is contained in article 43 
of API and specifies that combatants have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities.42  
As furthermore protection of civilians from direct attacks the second rule of the 
ICRC Study states that “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 	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35 API art. 48 
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37 API art. 50 
38 API art. 50 (3) 
39 Prosecutor v Galic (Trial Judgment) 2003 para 50 
40 ICRC Study 2004, rule 5 
41 Fleck 2008:80 
42 API art. 43 (2) 
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”43 The 
ICRC Study describes that state practice establishes the application of rule 1 
and 2 as the norms of customary international law for both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.44 It shows that protection in order to avoid 
from harming innocent civilians are highly respected and prioritized within the 
states’ application of international law of targeting. 
1.3.2	  Civilian	  objects	  versus	  military	  objectives	  
	  
The primary source of states’ obligation not to attack civilian objects can be 
found in article 23 (g) and 25 of the Hague Convention VI. The first specific 
reference to the military objective as a concrete rule of warfare is in the Hague 
Rules of Air Warfare of 1923. Article 24 (1) of the rules states: “aerial 
bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to 
say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct 
military advantage to the belligerent.”45 Although the Hague Rules were never 
adopted in a treaty instrument, “the principle of the military objective” has 
become a part of customary international law of armed conflict whether on 
land, at sea or in the air.46 
The general rule on definition and protection of civilian objects is given in 
article 52 of API: “civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of 
reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects, which are not military objectives as 
defined in paragraph 2.”47 The definition of military objectives follows in 
paragraph 2 respectively: “attacks shall be limited strictly to military 
objectives”, which are “objectives that by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”48 Thus, civilian objects are all objects that 
are not military objectives. Article 52 (3) of API ensures no gaps in case of 
doubt between these two categories and states that “in case of doubt whether 
an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of 
worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an 
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so 
used.”49  
Since, the definition of civilian object is primarily depends on the definition of 
military objectives, it is important to identify what military objective is. Although, 
article 52 gives an impeccable description, the terminology that are chosen in 
the article is abstract and general, and provides no list of specific military 
objectives by nature.50 Since every object except those who are protected can 	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46 ibid 
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50 Dinstein 2010:90 
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become a military object, it is difficult to formulate an exhaustive list of military 
objectives.51 Whether an object is military objective, and can be attacked, 
must therefore always be tested against the definition in article 52 (2) of API.52 
The definition consists of several significant elements and requirements that 
have to be fulfilled in order to make an attack lawful.  
An object must make an effective contribution to military action together with 
its destruction, capture, or neutralization that must offer a definite military 
advantage.53 The person who orders the attack must have information that will 
make him believe that the object would make an effective contribution to 
military action.54 En effective military contribution means that an object must 
have relevant military uses and thus military importance. 55 Neither political, 
economical, social nor psychological, but only military importance will make 
an object legitimate military objective. The effective military contribution must 
result in a military advantage that has to be defined and concrete, not 
probable or hypothetical.56 In addition, the advantage obtained from an attack 
must be military and not exclusively political. A potential political outcome of 
the attack is not allowed consideration in assessing whether the object is a 
military objective or not.57 The military advantage anticipated from an attack 
concerns the advantage expected from the attack considered as a whole and 
not only from particular parts of the attack.58 
The military advantage has to be concrete and direct, and should be 
substantial and relatively immediate.59 However, the prospective long-term 
and large-scale military advantage of an attack has to be assessed as a 
whole - in the context of its relation to the armed conflict.60 
Attention must be also paid to the words “in the circumstances ruling at the 
time” in the definition (art. 52(2) of API). The circumstances of hostilities 
change quickly, and with them the use of an object by the enemy, which was 
or could be defined as a military objective. 61 The assessment of 
circumstances together with definite military advantage has to be made by the 
military decision-maker, who will refer to the available at that time information 
and whose assessment will therefore be as accurate as that information 
allows.62 Therefore, the all-available information must be analysed in details 
and with possible prediction. However, in practice the decision-maker cannot 
make a decision to attack with the absolutely sureness. As a result, the 
provision of article 52(3) of API must be applied in such situations. 	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52 UK Manual 2004:56 
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57 Dinstein 2010:93 
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1.3.3	  Nature,	  location,	  use	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  military	  objective	  	  
Article 52(2) of API states four conditions – nature, location, purpose and use 
that, if they make an effective contribution to military action, make an object a 
military objective.63 Some objects are always military objectives by “their 
nature” despite their location or use, for example, combatants, enemy 
warships or military aircrafts, and they are automatically constitutes a lawful 
target for attack in wartime.64 However, the most objects in order to meet 
requirements in article 52(2) of API on a lawful target for attack, become a 
military objective only during the time that their particular location, purpose or 
use provides an effective contribution to military action. 65 With other words, 
the objects can become military objects through either use by military forces, 
location that is relevant to military operations, or purpose in form of future 
use.66 
The “location” category includes those objects that because of their particular 
location make an effective contribution to military action. For example bridges, 
areal of land of tactical importance.67 Thus, location includes objects or areas, 
which are militarily important for future operation because they must taken or 
denied to the enemy, or because the enemy must be made to retreat from 
them, regardless even of use or purpose.68 However, such military objectives 
cannot be too widespread. It should always be a tactical importance within the 
location of an area of land, whether because it would increase the attacker’s 
choices, or because of other reasons that are significant for the conduct of 
hostilities.69 Usually, such location can be objectively identified in advance, 
but it is essential to reassess the object before each attack in the ever-
changing circumstances that are standard for the battlefield.70  
The “purpose” of an object is concerned with its intended future use, while 
“use” is concerned with its present function.71 The purpose of an object must 
refer to adversary’s party planned future use of the object, which the attacker 
can conclude only from the information that is available to him from all 
possible sources at the relevant time.72 Unfortunately, it is not so easy to get 
the right information on enemy’s intentions about a concrete object’s use in 
the future. That is why the intelligence reports must be based on solid 
information and not on pure speculations.73 Especially, when the object that is 	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under assessment not a military objective by nature, such as church for 
instance, but which can become a military objective because of the enemy’s 
purpose to use it as munitions storage. 
Different sources and authors provide varying lists with examples on the term 
military objectives. The lists are not exhaustive. The UK Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict provides such examples in its list: combatant members of the 
enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, equipment, and 
installations, other objects which have military value such as bridges, 
communications towers, and electricity and refined oil production facilities;74 
areas of land of military significance such as hills, defiles, and bridgeheads; 
means of transportation used for moving military supplies or other supplies of 
military value, including railways, ports, airfields, bridges, canals, tunnels, and 
main roads; communications installations used for military purposes, including 
broadcasting and television stations, telephone and telegraph stations etc.75  
Dinstein provides following examples from his list of military objectives by 
nature: fixed military bases, barracks; temporary military command posts and 
camps; military aircraft; industrial plants engaged in the manufacture of 
munitions, military supplies; Ministries of Defence and any national, regional 
or local operational or coordination centers of command, control and 
communication relating to running the war etc.76 The fact that an object is on 
the list does not mean that it is necessarily a military objective. 
All in all, the objects classified as military objectives include much more than 
strictly military objects that varies from list to list. The object has to be set as 
military exactly under the circumstances ruling at the time, and not at some 
hypothetical future time, and at the same time include “activities providing 
administrative and logical support to military operations such as transportation 
and communication systems, railroads, airfields and port facilities and 
industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed conflict.”77 
1.3.4	  Indiscriminate	  attacks	  
	  
The more explicit rule that explicates the principle of distinction is the rule of 
discrimination. The rule prohibits indiscriminate attacks and is stated as rule 
11 in the ICRC Study.78 The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks as a principle 
of law that applies in both international and non-international armed conflicts 
is now broadly accepted as a customary principle.79 A large number of military 
manuals identify that indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and numerous 
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states have adopted legislation making it an offence to carry out such 
attacks.80  
Indiscriminate attacks are defined in the rule 12 of the ICRC Study and in 
article 51(4) of API as those: “a) which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or c) which employ a method or means 
of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international 
humanitarian law. And consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”81 
Thus, the rules refer not only to the actions of an attacker, but also to the 
methods and means of combat, that are implicated in the law of weaponry.82 
It is important to underline the difference between attacks directed against the 
civilian population – with an intention to harm the civilian population, and 
indiscriminate attacks of an attacker.83 During the attacks directed against 
civilian population, the attacker intentionally directs military operations against 
civilian targets. The type of weapon does not play any role in such attacks.84 
The most important is that the attacker uses weapon in the method that is 
intended to attack particularly civilian population, and thus breaches the 
fundamental rule of IHL stated in art. 48 of API. 
The key to differ that a certain attack has been indiscriminate is the 
unconcerned position of the attacker and the information available to the 
attacker in the real time.85 The first part of the rule in the article 51(4) (a) 
focuses on a particular way in which an attack is undertaken and which 
therefore can be indiscriminate. The choice of weapon’s way of use plays a 
significant role. The rule is concerned about how the weapon is actually used, 
and if the weapon is not directed in a specific military objective, the rule is 
breached.86 So this relates only to the actual conduct of the military operation 
and legal advices together with information that come to the appropriate 
commander.87 
The second part of article 51(4) – subparagraph (b) and (c) pays attention to 
the means - type of weapon that is employed in an attack, and methods of 
warfare to be directed in the specified way. The weapon that lacks the 
capability of being directed at a military objective, and thus is not able to 
distinguish between military and civilian targets, breaches the rule on 
distinction.88 The choice of a weapon that by its nature and design cannot 
possibly make distinction between military and civilian targets under any 
circumstances, shows an irresponsible ignore for the rule of distinction 	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between military objectives and civilian objects.89  
 
The final part of article 51(4) –subparagraph (c) also concerned with the 
legitimacy of weapons and prohibits the use of weapons whose effects cannot 
be limited, as the particular provisions under the API require.90  
But any weapon could be used in indiscriminate way, even if the weapon that 
is designed to be capable of distinguishing. Thus, the methods of use of 
weapon is sometimes more important than the type of used weapon as such. 
However, the weapon that should be chosen for a military attack has to be 
capable of distinguishing between military and civilian targets. Besides, there 
is always and under any circumstances has to be a military target during a 
military attack. Thus, the principle of distinction is the keystone of the law and 
the customs regulating protection of civilians during armed hostilities. 
 
1.4	  Principle	  of	  proportionality	  	  
The principle of proportionality is another important and absolutely core 
principle of both customary and codified international humanitarian law. It 
requires that the losses resulting from a military operation should not be 
excessive and disproportionate in relation to the military advantage that is 
expected. The principle of proportionality is a connection between the 
principles of military necessity and humanity and has intention to reduce 
incidental damage caused by military operations.91  
The rule of proportionality is an inherent part of basic obligation to distinguish 
between civilian and military targets in order to provide more protection for 
civilian population during military attacks. The rule of proportionality requires 
the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations by 
weighting the expected civilian harm against concrete military advantage. 92  
All military actions must be proportionate to the aim they want to fulfil. That is 
why each particular military operation must be planned with a very careful 
deliberation of the military advantage versus losses that will occur, especially 
among civilian population, together with consideration on use alternative 
methods and means in order to minimize the losses. The compliance of the 
balance between military advantage and civilian losses is extremely important 
regardless whether it is international or non-international armed conflict. 93 
Disproportionate attacks are an example of indiscriminate attacks and are 
stated in rule 14 of the ICRC Study and in API article 51(5)(b): “an attack that 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 	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damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, 
is indiscriminate and is prohibited.”94 The rule of proportionality is concerned 
about the decision whether to attack a military objective, not whether an object 
is a military objective. With other words, whether an attack on the object in a 
certain way will cause disproportionate collateral damage does not affect the 
object’s status as a military objective. Rather, a party must avoid launching an 
attack when the expected collateral damage would be excessive.95 
The proportionality is significantly important for the anticipation of collateral 
damage expected from an attack. Collateral damage stands for: a) incidental 
losses or injury to civilians; b) destruction of or damage to civilian objects; c) a 
combination of both.96  
Thus, current customary and treaty law of targeting validate the proportionality 
rule with the core on that an attack against military objectives expected to 
cause disproportionate collateral damage to civilian or civilian objects, in 
relation to expected military advantage, is unlawful. So even the legitimate 
target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be 
disproportionate towards to the specific military benefit from the attack.97 
However, the application of the principle of proportionality is more difficult in 
practice than it is stated as a rule, especially because of a particular number 
of circumstances together with the assessment of collateral damage that is 
always in opposite position to a certain military advantage.98 This assessment 
is the proportional test that must be applied in selection of any target for 
finding out in advance whether the attack expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof (“collateral civilian damage”) and whether it would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated. 99 If 
the answers are positive, the future attack would be disproportionate and 
thereby must be cancelled or suspended.  
But the proportionality assessment cannot be made easy like a mathematical 
formula. There are no fast rules and there is always unavoidable element of 
subjectivity of the decision-maker(s) regarding the judgements associated 
with the rule.100 To finding out in advance whether an attack would cause 
collateral civilian damage is complex and not always manageable task. 
Furthermore, the difficulty in calculating the degree of risk of collateral 
damage is massive, so the expected civilian losses cannot normally be 
foreseen with any precision. The situation occurs like this because “the 
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degree of risk that is permissible is always varying with the nature of the 
target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, and so on.”101  
The estimation of in what extent injury or damage is excessive is a very 
subjective process because it is a value judgement and about what is 
mentally visualized before the attack – the initial expectation and anticipation, 
and not the actual outcome of the attack. Therefore the attacker has an 
obligation to act reasonably and in good faith, and to weight all available 
information.102  
When it turns to assessment of military advantage that has to be concrete and 
direct, the attacker must make an overall calculation. Concrete and direct 
military advantage means that it should be substantial and relatively close 
military advantage, which is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant 
time. So those advantages that are hardly appreciable and appear in the long 
term should be disregarded. So, the military advantage cannot be estimated 
through the eyes of an individual soldier, tank crew or aviator, otherwise it 
would be a crucial mistake that would affect civilian population.103 
Thus, the assessment of both collateral civilian damage and military 
advantage in an attack has to be done with not a balance, but rather with 
excessiveness104 in mind, in order to fulfil the proportionality rule. Breach of 
the proportionality rule classifies as a war crime in the Rome Status of the 
International Criminal Code.105 
1.4.1	  The	  obligation	  of	  precautionary	  measures	  
	  
Precautions measures determine to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and 
damage to civilian properties, which both the attacker and defender must take 
in attacks and against the effects of attacks.106 
The principle of precautions in attack was first set out in Article 2(3) of the 
1907 Hague Convention and provided that “if for military reasons immediate 
action against naval or military objectives located within an undefended town 
or port is necessary, and no delay can be allowed the enemy… and the 
commander of a naval force shall take all due measures in order that the town 
may suffer as little harm as possible”.107 Today the next predominant rule of 
legal regulation of military hostilities – precautionary obligation is codified in 
API article 57. This provision as well as the rule 15 in the ICRC Study,108 
declares important obligations imposed on the attacker to avoid 
disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks.  	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The article 57 starts with a general statement that reaffirms the principle of 
distinction.109 Further paragraphs of the article provide sub rules on 
justification that everything feasible must be taken and done before choosing 
the legal targets, and means and methods of attack in order to avoid civilian 
losses and damage to civilian objects.110 
The term “feasible” is generally understood as everything that is “practically or 
practicable possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
including humanitarian and military considerations”.111 Although, the “all 
practically possible” defines subjectively, the obligation to do everything in 
order to protect civilians is of crucial importance before every military attack. 
The obligation is concerned to act in good faith and diligence for a 
commander when deciding the military character of an objective selected for 
attack.112  
Another significant factor of executable precautions is the information that 
available at the time of the decision-making for a military commander. Since 
the plan and decision to launch an attack is based on the crucial information 
about the absent of civilians from the vicinity of a military objective, the 
commander has to get information up to date at the relevant time – collected 
and clarified just prior to the time of action.113 
However, there is no requirement that the attacker has to be certain about the 
lawfulness of the object that is about to be attacked, because of the many 
practical factors that make it impossible. So, it is normal for an attacker (an 
commander) to doubt. In this case additional information must be order from 
the intelligence and a variety of sources.114 Article 57(2)(a)(iii) of API obligates 
commanders and their planning staff refrain from launching any attack that 
may cause collateral civilian damage excessive in relation to the expected 
concrete and direct military advantage.115 At that time it becomes evident that 
the objective is not a military or the attack will cause collateral civilian damage, 
so the principle of proportionality cannot be maintained, the attack shall be 
cancelled or suspended.116 
Article 57(3) establishes the rule on selection between several military targets 
(objectives) if possible. At the same time the provision charges the 
commander to verify that an object to be attacked constitutes a military 
objective. The primary obligation on verification of selecting the optimal object 
usually “devolves on relatively high echelons” - those who normally overview 
the whole military situation.117 In addition each commander selecting a target 
must pay regard to some or all of the following factors before he makes up his 	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mind to attack it: “a) whether he can personally verify the target; b) 
instructions from higher authority about objects which are not to be targeted; 
c) intelligence reports, aerial or satellite reconnaissance pictures, and any 
other information in his possession about the nature of the proposed target; d) 
any rules of engagement imposed by higher authority under which he is 
required to operate; e) the risks to his own forces necessitated by target 
verification;”118 
 
What is also important is the evaluation of alternative attack methods and 
choices between available means and methods in order to find those that 
would minimize unwanted collateral civilian damage.119  
 
Article 57(2)(c) of API prescribes to give effective advance warnings before 
the attacks that would affect civilians, unless circumstances do not permit.120 
Warnings are intended “to allow, as far as possible, civilians to leave a locality 
before it is attacked”. It is however, not so easy to decide what kind of 
advance notification would be an effective enough warning, nor is it clear how 
definite and direct the warning has to be. 121 As	  the	  essential	  complementary	  to	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  effective	  protection	  of	  civilians	  in	  armed	  conflict	  in	  article	  57	  and	  58,	  article	  58	  of	  API	  obligates	  both	  attacker	  and	  defender	  to	  take	  practical	  steps	  to	  the	  “maximum	  extent	  feasible”	  to	  protect	  and	  reduce	  the	  danger	  for	  civilians	  resulting	  from	  military	  operations.122	  Effective	  civilian	  protection	  demands	  that	  both	  precautions	  in	  attack	  and	  against	  the	  effects	  of	  attack	  are	  taken	  with	  “equivalent	  degree	  of	  care,	  thoroughness,	  and	  good	  faith.”123	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Chapter	  2	  
The	  character	  and	  nature	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  
	  
Cluster munitions are ordinary munitions each of which is designed to 
disperse or release multiple submunitions, bomblets or grenades, over an 
area that may extend from hundred to thousands square meters. The general 
definition of this weapon describes both the container or canister - parent 
munition and the submunitions it holds.124 Each cluster munition consists of a 
canister and several submunitions, which after being dropped or fired, opens 
in mid-air and ejects its cargo of submunitions. These submunitions then 
scatter over the target area and are designed to explode on impact. 125 Cluster 
munitions can be dispatched from aircraft, via rockets, missiles or bombs, as 
well as launched from land-based systems such as artillery, from rockets, 
artillery shells or missiles.126  
Cluster munitions are area weapons that create hundreds meters wide 
“footprint” when dispersed. This means that they affect a substantial area 
without any limits to one concrete military target. Cluster munitions as a mean 
of warfare often compares to such area weapons as napalm or incendiary 
bombs, and even nuclear weapons.127  
The distinctive feature of cluster munitions is their submunitions. As any 
other weapon, cluster munitions may fail and cause submunitions that would 
be unexploded. Due to variety of reasons, among which can be technical 
failure, inappropriate launch or even soft terrain, a certain number of 
submunitions in each canister can fail to explode on impact.128 
Consequently, because of the large numbers and their close use to each 
other in a single attack, cluster munitions leave behind a disproportionately 
large amount of unexploded submunitions. Developments in cluster 
munitions technology since the 1970s have mostly concentrated on 
reducing the submunitions failure rate through simple fuzes, self-destruction 
mechanisms, and so-called sensor fuzing. It helps for each single 
submunition to detect and target heat signatures and profiles.129 
Cluster munitions are excellent area weapons, as many of military 
commanders worldwide would agree. There is no doubt that cluster munitions 
as means of warfare are militarily effective against certain types of target 
placed on a wide area, or dispersed targets.130 Cluster bombs are effective 
against certain types of armour, artillery, accumulation of troops and other 
military assets. They are perhaps the most effective weapons at stopping or 
slowing an enemy assault. Therefore military necessity for the use of cluster 	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munitions is significant. In addition, some experts believe that improvements 
in technology make cluster munitions even more accurate than unguided 
munitions, thus reducing the possibility of unintended collateral damage. 131 
Herthel argues that “the fact that cluster munitions create a large battlefield 
footprint is not, by itself, reason to consider the weapon indiscriminate”.132 
Furthermore, he states that an effective employment of cluster munitions 
against legitimate military objectives is possible because munitions are not 
indiscriminate by their very nature.133 
Regardless of the type or design of cluster munitions they all are a particular 
threat to civilian population during and after use. But because of the capability 
of cluster munitions to deliver explosives over a large-area targets such as 
airfield, industrial plans, tanks etc., together with the potential to attack moving 
or unseen target, make them a very attractive and effective mean of 
warfare.134  However, the special military characteristics of cluster munitions 
initiate also fundamental humanitarian problems for civilians and local 
communities. The use of cluster munitions in over 60 years has showed that 
their wide effect on civilians is more significant than one could predict, that 
make them to one of most terrible weapons in the history of mankind so far. 
 
2.1	  Humanitarian	  impact	  of	  cluster	  munitions 
 
The wide dissemination and majority of free-falling submunitions almost 
guarantee civilian casualties, especially when the weapon is used in or near 
populated areas.135 Because of the unguided character of submunitions, they 
cannot be guided towards a single target and as the result are imprecise. 
Cluster munitions is therefore effective to apply only on large surface with big 
military targets such as military factories, airfields etc. If there is at least a little 
chance that civilians or/and civilian objects are near the military target, the 
probably that civilian casualties would occur is extremely high and almost 
inevitable. Thus, to not cause humanitarian harm, cluster munitions have to 
be applied only on open and uninhabited areas. But in practice unfortunately, 
cluster munitions were always applied in or near populated areas.136 
The submunitions’ failure rates are very high. Many submunitions do not 
explode upon impact as intended after they have been launched.137 They 
continue lying on the ground and causing risk of killing and maiming people 
long after the attack. So, the unexploded submunitions duds aggravate the 	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situation for civilians by making obstacle for farming, hunting, herding animals 
or collecting wood, which are usually the main livelihood activities for civilians 
in rural areas. Since this type of weapon is extremely unpredictable, the 
dangerous for civilians increases automatically. A slightest movement by any 
person can detonate a submunition even after it was moved several times.138 
Because of the usually large amount of submunitions that is delivered by 
launched cluster munitions, even the low failure rate results in a devastating 
impact on civilians in both direct and indirect ways. In many countries and 
regions, unexploded submunitions and duds are a major cause of deaths and 
injuries to civilians. Indeed, in a global study in November 2006, Handicap 
International concluded that 98% of recorded cluster munitions casualties 
were civilians.139 Thus, submunitions duds deprive people from their 
fundamental human right – right to security. “People are forced to balance 
their need for land with the threat of being killed or injured” as UNDP report 
stated.140 
Except of physical casualties that cluster munitions’ victims face, the impact of 
this type of weapon cause also psychological trauma for civilians. For 
survivors of cluster munitions use, the psychological distress is often 
inevitably and devastating. It is a known fact that victims suffer a loss of 
dignity and self-respect, in addition to being rejected by their communities 
because of their disability.141 The most common victims of cluster munitions 
are adult men, who often represent a main source of income in family. Loss of 
the income only increases the personal tragedy of losing a father, brother or 
husband, and thus psychological press on the whole family.142 
Those are only a part of the wide and multi-faceted humanitarian impact that 
cluster munitions have on civilians.  
2.2	  Legal	  regulation	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  as	  a	  mean	  of	  warfare	  	  
One of the first and most significant (at that time) attempts to regulate the law 
of war, with the special attention to restrictions of means and methods of 
warfare, was the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868. The purpose of the 
Declaration was to dismiss the use of exploding bullets weighing less than 
400 grams. It was an important addition to the three principles – military 
objective, distinction and humanity that Declaration has declared.143 
 
Provisions in the Hague Convention 1907 limit the means of warfare: “the right 
of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”144 
together with prohibition “to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to 	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cause unnecessary suffering”145 and prohibition to launch “the attack or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings 
which are undefended.”146 
 
The Additional Protocol I reaffirms the basic rules that prohibit and restrict use 
of particular weapon. “In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the 
conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.”147  
 
Prohibition of certain weapons – means of warfare, aims to reduce the 
brutality between combatants and civilian population during an armed conflict. 
Although the above-mentioned provisions limit methods and means of warfare, 
they neither prohibit not restrict the use of any specific weapon, such as other 
conventions do.148 However, until 2008, there was no particular treaty that 
prohibited or restricted the use of such weapons as cluster munitions. Since 
cluster munitions were not and are not equivalent to anti-personnel 
landmines149, the legality of their use could not be regulated by either 
Conventional Weapons Treaty 1980150 or Mine Band Treaty 1999.151 
There were several attempts to restrict the use of cluster munitions during the 
last 40 years. The Lucerne (1974) and Lugano (1976) Conferences, as well 
as the Conventional Weapons Treaty (Protocol II) considered possible bans 
or restriction on certain antipersonnel weapons, did however nothing to limit 
the use and employment of cluster munitions. Similarly, the Ottawa Treaty 
does not ban or regulate the use of cluster munitions.152  
Nevertheless, the issues on cluster munitions’ restrictions were kept alive and 
resulted in 2003 into a new instrument as addition to CCW – Protocol V on 
Explosive Remnants of War. Protocol V on ERW restrictes also cluster 
munitions, more precisely cluster munitions that did not explode on impact 
and defined as unexploded ordnance.153 However, the Protocol did not 
prohibit the use of cluster munitions as such. After a several conferences on 
cluster munitions in Lima, Belgrade, Brussels, Vienna, Oslo and Wellington 
during the period 2003-2008, in May 2008 the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions was adopted. 154 It entered into force on 01 August 2010. 
The conception of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is based on the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular, the 
principle that the right of the parties to an armed conflict on choosing the 
means and methods of warfare is not unlimited, and the fundamental principle 	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of distinction.155 There is no other multinational treaty that prohibits or restricts 
the lawful circumstances of the cluster munitions’ use. Thus, the CCM is the 
only international convention that regulates the whole spectrum of issues 
related to cluster munitions. Although, cluster munitions have become a 
prohibited mean of warfare only for those states that have ratified the 
Convention. For states that are not a party to the Convention, cluster 
munitions’ use is not prohibited as such and is regulated by the international 
customs and rules of law of armed conflicts.156 
Currently the Convention on Cluster Munitions has 112 signatories, out of 
which 82 are also State parties.157 Consequently, not all states are the parties 
to CCM, and it is uncertain whether it will be new parties and how many in the 
future. So there is always be a possibility that cluster munitions could be used 
as a mean of warfare by a state not party to CCM and thus, not obligated to 
refrain from the weapons’ use as such. The significance of examination of 
each cluster munitions’ use case-by-case with conformity to the law of 
targeting is therefore very high.   
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Chapter	  3	  
The	  use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  during	  the	  5-­‐days	  war	  
 
Human Rights Watch researches found unexploded submunitions, pieces of 
detonated submunitions, carrier bombs and rockets during their multiple 
missions to the Gori and Kareli districts just south of the South Ossetian 
administrative border.158Additionally, the Dutch investigative commission's 
report and the report of HALO Trust in cooperation with Norwegian People's 
Aid constitute a cogent evidence of the employment of cluster munitions in 
those areas, which mainly populated by civilians.  
3.1.	  Use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  by	  Russia	  
	  
Russia had not acknowledged in 2008-2009, and continues to deny the use of 
cluster munitions during the conflict in Georgia.159 However, the evidence that 
have been collected by Human Rights Watch, Norwegian People’s Aid and 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs show the use of cluster munitions exactly 
by Russia on the territory of Georgia. The evidence can be divided into 3 
groups.  
Firstly, the exact used type of cluster munitions has been ascertained. Human 
Rights Watch researches gathered overwhelming evidence that several 
villages in Gori and Kareli districts had been hit by air-dropped RBK-500s and 
RBK-250s carrying AO-2.5 RTM submunitions and by “Uragan” missiles 
carrying 9N210 submunitions. Human Rights Watch also found that Gori city 
had been struck by an “Iskander” SS-26 ballistic missile carrying 
submunitions. 160 All weapons systems that were used are produced in Russia 
and are known to be in Russian’s arsenal. In turn, Georgia also disposes 
cluster munitions in its arsenal. However, there was not any evidence that 
would show availability of particularly that type of weapon in Georgia. The 
Georgian authorities have acknowledged only and exclusively availability of 
PC30 Grad LAR-160 with rackets MK-4, with submunitions M-85. 161 Georgia 
also acknowledges availability of bombs RBK-500 in its arsenal, but 
announced that their shelf lives have expired and they were slated for 
destruction. 162  
Secondly, the international organisations being experts on cluster munitions 
and who worked on demining in the region, found submunitions to be 
Russian.163 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action 
Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010. In the 
beginning of 2009 Norwegian People Aid’s deminers found evidence of 9N210 	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submunitions from the August 2008 conflict in two additional villages: Kvemo 
Khviti and Zemo Nikozi. 164 The 9N210 submunitions belong to “Uragan” 
missiles that carrying those submunitions, and thereby are Russian.  
In addition, the report of Dutch commission on investigation of RTL- reporter 
Storimans’ death on the 12 of August 2008 in Gori, states that Storimans was 
killed by racket SS26 that is Russian. 165  
The third group includes evidence from interviewed eyewitnesses. They 
stated that the strikes were on Georgian troops - so the targets were 
Georgian, not Russian. 166 Furthermore, the eyewitnesses claimed that 
Georgian troops were no longer presented in the conflict zone, but they were 
in the general area before. Although as the Russian troops were not in the 
conflict area at all. 167 Since the Georgian troops could not be a target of 
Georgian troops, the attacks were made by Russian troops.  
Hereby the facts presented above confirm the use of cluster munitions by 
Russia in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south 
of the South Ossetian administrative border. In nine strikes Russian cluster 
munitions affected populated areas, in three of them – in Gori, Ruisi and 
Variani the strikes killed and injured dozens of civilians.168  
3.1.1.	  Use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Gori	  
	  
On the morning of August 12 several dozens civilian had gathered on the 
central square of Gori to receive humanitarian relief. 169 Two victims estimated 
that there were at least 40 civilians on the square that morning.170 The main 
command center for the Georgian military operation in South Ossetia was 
located near the main square of Gori. All Georgian troops had left the city by 
the evening of August 11, according to eyewitnesses, which Human Rights 
Watch has interviewed. All of them consistently argued that there were no 
military forces on the square when it was attacked.171  
At around 10:45 a.m. Russian troops inflicted a blow on the main square with 
the application of cluster munitions. 172 As the result 5 people were killed and 
24 injured then and there.173 Among those who were killed on the central 
square that day was a Dutch cameramen for the Dutch television station RTL 
– Stan Storimans. On August 29, 2008 the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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has sent an investigating commission consisting of military and diplomatic 
experts to Gori to investigate the Storimans’ death.174  
Furthermore, the analisys of the foto- and videomaterials showed that the 
square and its vicinity were damaged by twenty explosions at around 10:45 
am, where the each explosion spreaded a lot of bullets.175 The videomaterials 
from Georgian authorities, CNN and SkyNews showed that after the 
explosions on the west side of the square, the warhead of the missile felt. On 
the undersite of this warhead can be seen the serial number of the missile.176 
From the available fotos made by Georgian authorities and NGO HALO Trust, 
can be seen that the each 100 meters of the square were covered with the 
particles from the racket motor.177  
On the basis of the available photos of the racket’s fragments, that were found 
around the square, it has been determined the similarity with the racket type 
SS26. This is clear like from the visual features, as from the serial number 
found on the photos of the racket’s fragments.178 The SS26 is a modern 
tactical ballistic missile that only Russia has in its weapons arsenal.179 
The Dutch commission has also established, and thus made clear the 
movements and location of the both armies at the moment of the explosion on 
August 12. In response to the Russian army’s advance, all Georgian troops 
had hastily retreated.	  On August 12 the Georgian military and police units 
have already left Gori, as the most part of city’s inhabitants did. There were 
only old people and those who wanted to take care of their homes and stores 
in the city.180 Thus, it can bee concluded that by August 12 all Georgian troops 
had already left Gori, which supports the findings made by Human Rights 
Watch’s researchers.  
3.1.2	  Use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  in	  Ruisi 
 
On the morning of August 12 Russian forces fired the missiles RS30 “Uragan” 
with submunitions 9N210 on the north-western and south-eastern parts of the 
village Ruisi. As the result of the attack which found place between 11 a.m. 
and 14 p.m., the whole population of Ruisi suffered casualties, 3 civilians were 
killed and 6 injured. 181 Human Rights Watch did numerous interviews with 
victims and witnesses among civilians in Ruisi. Many civilians living in this 
village were finding either fragments of missile RS30 “Uragan” or shells’ 
9N210 containers in backyards of their homes after the attack. In addition, 
Human Rights Watch researchers by exploring the territory of the village 
independently have found fragments of missiles RS30 “Uragan” and 	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unexposed submunitions 9N210.182 The submunitions had destroyed many 
homes’ windows and left shrapnel marks on the walls of many homes. The 
leader of deminers estimated the 9N210s in his 200,000 square meter area of 
operation had a 35 percent dud rate.183 
Most of villagers who spoke to Human Rights Watch said that Georgian 
troops had moved through the village the previous day – August 11. On the 
day of attack Georgian troops have already left the village and were stationed 
in a few kilometres outside Ruisi. 184 One woman described how Georgian 
troops were leaving the area of the village with their equipment by two roads 
on August 11, the day before the attack. Another villager, however, argued 
that Georgian troops were in the village at the time of the attack. 185 
3.1.3	  Use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  in	  Variani  
 
Variani is situated on the one of two roads between Tskhinvali and Gori. 
During the conflict the village was twice the subject to cluster munitions 
attacks. As the result of the attacks 3 civilians were killed and 16 injured. 186 
The first attack struck in the center of Variani around 10:30 a.m. on August 8. 
That morning more than a dozen civilians including children were in the public 
square for a daily gathering when the attack occurred. 187 The second attack 
was on the morning on August 12. Human Rights Watch has interviewed 
witnesses and victims of the attacks, together with collecting physical 
evidence in the form of unexploded submunitions, remnants of delivery 
rockets, and numerous fragments from the weapon systems. 188 Based on this 
fieldwork Human Rights Watch was able to indicate the type of munitions 
used in the attacks. It has concluded that Variani was stuck by RBK-500 
cluster munitions loaded with AO-2.5 RTM submunitions. 189 
According to the statements of villagers when the first cluster munitions attack 
occurred in Variani on August 8, Georgian troop had just entered Tskhinvali, 
which is 20 km from Variani.190 On August 12, at the time of the second 
attack, Georgian troops had withdrawn from Tskhinvali and reportedly had left 
Gori, which is 12,5 km from Variani, already the night before. Although some 
villagers with whom Human Rights Watch spoke said that Georgian troops 
might have been in the fields surrounding Variani. 191 However, all villagers 
were unanimous that none of Georgian troops were in the village at the time 
of the attacks. 192 	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The neighboring villages had also been suffering from cluster munitions 
attacks. Human Rights Watch itself found evidence of Russian cluster 
munitions in or near four other villages. Like this, researches found AO-2.5 
RTM submunitions in Akhaldaba and physical evidence of RBK-250 canisters 
that carry AO-2.5 RTMs in Varianis Merneoba.193 One farmer living in 
Akhaldaba told Human Rights Watch about the rocket that has fallen in his 
backyard and had suffered a catastrophic failure by not properly released its 
submunitions, most of which had not exploded. 194 Human Rights Watch 
researchers found many pieces of 9N210 submunitions at the craters both at 
his home and in his field. The farmer also added: “There was no Georgian 
military here on the 11th [of August]. The entire village was empty. There were 
only five people remaining. There was nobody around. I have no idea why the 
Russians would attack.” 195 
Residents of Varianis Merneoba showed Human Rights Watch researchers 
nine fragments of RBK-250 pusher plates, which have the AO-2,5 RTM 
submunitions. Each bomb has three such plates that form a circle. The 
residents informed that Russians had done extensive demining in that area 
before they left the area in October 2008. 196 
Norwegian Peoples Aid, who was demining the territory since March 2009, 
reported to Human Rights Watch that 9N210s submunitions were identified in 
two additional villages, which means that this type of cluster munitions was 
used during the conflict. The submunitions were found in a garden outside of 
Kvemo Khviti and in Zemo Nikozi. 197 In the latter the remains of an RS3O 
“Uragan” rocket and its submunitions were found in 100 meters behind a 
school. 198 
3.1.4	  Aftereffects	  
	  
Human Rights Watch stated that the amount of unexploded submunitions 
found by Norwegian People’s Aid indicated that the potential for future injuries 
is high.199 The presence of Russian unexploded submunitions caused 
significant socioeconomic harm after the conflict. 200 Since the whole economy 
in the region depends considerably on agriculture, the unexploded munitions 
hindered many Georgians’ ability to harvest their crops and graze livestock, 
largely depriving them from their only source of living. Human Rights Watch 
reports consist of civilians’ histories about findings of unexploded 
submunitions in their homes, fields and garders. The Russian forces’ 
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decisions to use cluster munitions with high dud rates led to remarkable post-
conflict challenges for civilians.201   
 
3.2	  Use	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  by	  Georgia	  
	  
During the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, Georgia used 
cluster munitions too. In contrast to Russia, Georgia had admitted the use of 
cluster munitions. Originally denying, but eventually on September 1, 2008, 
Georgia publicly acknowledged that from August 8 to 11 it used cluster 
munitions “against Russian military equipment and armament marching from 
Rocki tunnel to Dzara road”.202 Georgia purchased from Israel ground-
launched M-85 submunitions, the same as 5M095, carried by 160mm MK-4 
rockets.203 Georgian Ministry of Defence responded in November 2008 to the 
Human Rights Watch request that it launched 24 complexes munitions of 13 
GradLAR (MK-4) rockets each. If they all were cluster munitions, they would 
have carried 32,448 M58 submunitions. 204 Thus, the amount of prospectively 
used cluster munitions by Georgia is significant.  
The Georgian Ministry of Defence claimed that Georgian cluster munitions 
“were never used against civilians, civilian targets and civilian populated or 
nearby areas”.205 Notwithstanding this allegation, Human Rights Watch, as 
well as international demining organisations and even Georgian military 
deminers, gathered evidence of Georgian submunitions in or near a band of 
nine villages in the north in the Gori district.206 These towns and villages were 
Brotsleti, Ditsi, Kvemo Khviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, 
Zemo Khviti and Zemo Nikozi.207 Human Rights Watch researches found 
unexploded submunitions, ribbons from detonated submunitions and MK-4 
160mm rockets.208 Among the international demining organisations that did 
cleaning in Georgia after the conflict, was the HALO Trust. HALO’s fieldwork 
of the Gori Tskhinvali corridor has been completed in summer 2009, 
identifying 25 cluster munitions or unexploded ordnance (UXO) impacted 
villages, requiring clearance of 31 areas.209 HALO Trust has identified the use 
of 5M095 which is Georgian in following towns and villages: Shindisi, 
Pkhvenisi, Kvemo Nikozi, Ergneti, Meghvrekisi, Brotsleti, Tirdznisi and Ditsi.210  
Georgian cluster munitions killed at least one civilian and wounded at the 
minimum two more when they landed near the towns of Shindisi and Tirdznisi. 
According to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, there were 	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Georgian, but not Russian troops and tanks in the area at the time of the 
strikes.211 
On August 9 at around 3:30 pm M85s strike killed one and caused two 
casualties on the edge of Shindisi. Human Rughts Watch found M85s near 
the site of the killed civilian.212 In accordance with one eyewitness, Georgian 
troops had taken position near Shindisi during their several attacks into and 
retreats out of Tskhinvali. The village was not occupied, however significant 
Georgian forces spent the night in the near field from August 9 to 10, as the 
witness stated.213 Another two witnesses argued that Georgian troops and 
tanks were passing through the area at the moment of cluster munitions 
attack, although not at the same place were civilian casualties were 
reported.214 
On the same day, August 9 at around 3:30 pm another village – Tirdznisi was 
attacked by M85s strike. According to one witness, there were no troops in 
the village on the day of attack. He showed to Human Rights Watch personnel 
an M85 fragmentation ring from the attack and three small craters consistent 
with an M85 explosion in his backyard and garden.215 Other witnesses 
reported that Georgian submunitions felt in the middle of Tirdznisi.216 
Human Rights Watch reported that Georgia’s submunitions landed on villages 
in as much because of a massive failure. The organisation’s researches found 
evidence contradictory with the typical use of M85.217 There were more M85 
duds than M85 submunitions in the Gori district area, where many of the duds 
were in an unarmed position. In addition, the interviewed witnesses testified 
that Russian troops were not in the area of the Georgian strikes.218 In 
February 2009, the Georgian Ministry of Defence wrote to Human Rights 
Watch that the M85s might have landed in the Gori District because of a 
“failure of the weapons system”.219 Human Rights Watch has previously 
reported about the Israelis self-destructed M85 munitions’ high dud rate – an 
actual rate of 5 to 10 percent, which was 1.3 to 2.3 percent more than failure 
rate reported in testing.220  
Furthermore, Georgia was investigating the M85 type of cluster munitions that 
failed so extensively. Accordantly to the Ministry of Defence, Georgia ordered 
supply of the M85 submunitions with self-destruct devices.221 Though Human 
Rights Watch and Georgian military deminers found originally non-self-
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destruct models, which is another model of M85 submunitions.222 Even if 
there was a failure of the weapons system, the attacks highlight the fact that 
cluster munitions are highly dangerous to use. The large number of duds 
causes the consequences of failure that are colossal for civilians. 
3.2.1	  Aftereffects	  	  
	  
Human Rights Watch reported death of at least three civilians and wounding 
six as the result of M85 duds when they were disturbed in Brotsleti, Pkhvenisi, 
and Shindisi. Notwithstanding the lack of civilian casualties in Ditsi, two 
incidents documented there by Human Rights Watch show the ongoing and 
extensive danger of duds in the area.223 The danger is especially high for 
children who find unexploded submunitions in the gardens and playgrounds. 
As Russian cluster munitions duds, Georgian also interfered with livelihoods. 
Local civilians, who in the Gori district depend completely on agriculture, has 
to choose between going to their farms and risking being injured or dead by 
an unexploded submunitions or a dud, or staying at home and letting the 
whole family to starve.  
Georgian submunitions killed at least four civilians and injured at least eight 
during the attack or after.224 Georgian authorities declare that cluster 
munitions were applied exclusively on Russian military targets in unpopulated 
areas just south of the Roki Tunnel. Consequently, the civilian casualties and 
humanitarian pollution in a large populated areas in the Gori district, were the 
result of a massive failure of the used cluster munitions’ system. It proves 
once again the all danger that cluster munitions bear, additionally to every 
possible technical failure that automatically increases the harm to civilians in 
form of unexploded submunitions and duds.225 
 
3.3	  The	  used	  types	  of	  cluster	  munitions	  during	  the	  conflict	  
	  
Thus, during the only 5 days of the conflict the majority of ERW has been 
restricted to a 10km by 20km high-intensity conflict zone between Gori and 
Tskhinvali. Within this area, which is mostly inhabited by civilians, there 
were a total of 16 villages polluted with cluster munitions and 9 villages with 
UXO contamination.226 
It is important to characterize the types of cluster munitions used during the 
conflict. The HALO Trust that was cleaning the region has identified a total 
of 16 villages affected by cluster munitions delivered by both aircraft and 
rocket systems: 	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• AO-2.5RTM (delivered by RBK-500 airdropped bomb): Akhaldaba, 
Variani, Varianis Meurneoba, Karaleti 
 
• 9N210 (delivered by 220mm “Uragan” rockets): Ruisi, Dzlevijvari, 
Akhaldaba, Karaleti, Karbi, Kvemo Nikozi, Kvemo Khviti, Zemo Nikozi 
• M095 (delivered by 160mm LAR rockets): Shindisi, Pkhvenisi, Kvemo 
Nikozi, Ergneti, Meghvrekisi, Brotsleti, Tirdznisi and Ditsi.227 
The AO-2.5RTM is an anti-personnel submunition delivered in this conflict by 
RBK-500 air-dropped bombs. This type uses explosive fragmentation to kill 
troops and destroy unarmoured targets. The submunition is armed in flight. If 
the submunitions are dispensed at too low altitude they may not reach a 
sufficient rate of spin to arm. An RBK-500 carries 108 submunitions.228  
The 9N210 is an anti-personnel submunition delivered in this conflict by 
9M27K 220mm (“Uragan”) artillery rockets. The 9N210 has an impact fuze 
and a self-destruct mechanism. Each Uragan rocket carries 30 submunitions; 
up to 16 rockets can be fired in a single salvo.229 
The M095 is a dual purpose anti-personnel and anti-armor submunition. It is a 
variant of the Israeli M85 submunition, and does not have a self-destruct 
mechanism. The M095 has a shaped-charge to defeat armor and a notched 
fragmentation jacket. Each rocket contains 104 submunitions; up to 26 
rockets can be fired in a single salvo.230 
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Chapter	  4	  
The	  legal	  assessment	  of	  the	  cluster	  munitions’	  use	  by	  
Russia	  and	  Georgia	  in	  and	  near	  populated	  civilian	  areas	  
	  
The conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 is an international armed 
conflict as it took place between two independent states. Since the conflict 
consisted of variety of armed actions and military operations, the hostilities 
between mentioned countries crossed the threshold of armed conflict and 
therefor is the subject to the law of armed conflicts. 
The one of the main aims of the legal regulation of warfare is protection of 
those who do not or do not longer participate in armed hostilities. Law of 
armed conflicts with help of its instruments – principles and rules, regulates 
the conduct of hostilities, means and methods of warfare in order to protect in 
particularly the main group of those who do not participate in armed hostilities 
– civilians. Russian and Georgian military forces were obligated among others 
to ensure respect and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, 
together with the restrictions of method and means of warfare during the 
conflict.  
The cluster munitions used by Russia and Georgia caused serious and 
ongoing civilian harm. Although the immediate harm in form of civilian losses 
from the attacks seems to be limited, the long-term effects in terms of massive 
injuries and inaccessibility to harvesting because of the large amount of 
unexploded submunitions and duds have been considerable. 
Consequently, it is significant to prove with help of legal instruments that 
Russia and Georgia have violated the fundamental principles of the law of 
armed conflicts by using cluster munitions in and near populated civilian areas, 
as prohibited mean of warfare.  
	  
4.1	  Analyse	  of	  the	  cluster	  munitions’	  use	  in	  and	  near	  populated	  
civilian	  areas	  in	  accordance	  with	  principle	  of	  distinction	  
 
Direct willful attacks against civilians or civilian objects are forbidden - the first 
and principal deduction from the obligation of distinction.231 
In the Galic Appeals Judgment, the Appeal Chamber highlighted that “there is 
an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilian in customary international 
law” and that “the prohibition against attacking civilians and civilian objects 
may not be derogated from because of military necessity.”232   
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Russia acknowledges the principle of distinction by recognizing it in Russian 
Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL233 and the Russian 
Federation’s Military Manual. 234 Georgia recognizes the principle of 
distinction through its Criminal Code.235  
However, as the result of the attacks by Russian military troops in and near 
populated civilian areas  - nine villages in the Gori -Tskhinvali corridor south of 
the South Ossetian administrative border, 5 civilians were killed and 24 injured 
(the city of Gori), 3 killed and 6 injured (in Ruisi), Variani – 3 killed and 16 
injured (in Varani). As the result of Georgian cluster munitions’ strikes in the 
region north of the Gori district that is also populated by civilians area, at least 
4 civilians were killed and 8 were injured. In addition, many of civilian objects 
such as civilians' homes and agricultural fields were attacked in those and 
other villages.236   
It is significant to determine whether those killed and injured together with 
others who were attacked during the hostilities in nine villages in the Gori -
Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border and in 
the region north of the Gori district, had a legal civilian status. Furthermore, it 
is important to determine whether the targets that were affected by cluster 
munitions were legal target – military objectives. 
4.1.1	  Assessment	  of	  the	  persons	  who	  were	  affected	  in	  populated	  
civilian	  areas	  -­‐	  the	  region	  in	  the	  Gori	  -­‐Tskhinvali	  corridor	  south	  of	  the	  
South	  Ossetian	  administrative	  border	  and	  in	  the	  region	  north	  of	  the	  
Gori	  district	  	  
There is no doubt that those who were affected - were killed and injured by 
both Russian and Georgian cluster munitions' strikes, were native inhabitants 
and constituted civilian populations of the region in the Gori -Tskhinvali 
corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border. On the morning of 
August 12, when the main square of Gori was attacked, at least 40 native 
inhabitancies were there. In addition two international journalists were on the 
square at the moment of the attack. During the two attacks on the public 
square in Variani, August 8 and 12, dozens of inhabitants were on the square 
as well. The evidences that there were no military forces during the all three 
attacks, confirms that inhabitants that gathered on the squares those days for 
humanitarian relief were civilians.  
Many of civilians witnessed also that they have been affected by attacks while 
being inside or on the backyard of their homes, and even while children were 
playing outside. Furthermore, there were no evidences about their 	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Regulation on Application of IHL, the ICRC Study refers to its Criminal Code. 
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participation in hostilities. It is also a little possibility that civilians who were 
doing their usual daily work within the houses and who suddenly were 
affected by cluster bombs could participate in hostilities. This points out that 
the affected civilians both on the squares and those within their homes were 
not directly participating in the hostilities, and thus had a civilian status. 
Furthermore, it is logically to assume that those civilians were neither 
combatants nor members of any armed units/organized resistance 
movements. Thus, according to articles 50(1) and (2) of API they were 
civilians. According to article 51(3) of API, those civilians shall enjoy 
protection from being attacked.  
With regard to objects that were affected by cluster munitions such as the 
main command center for the Georgian military operation in South Ossetia in 
the city of Gori, the main square of Gori and public square in the center of 
Variani, together with the houses and agricultural fields in the region in the 
Gori -Tskhinvali corridor, which were hit by cluster submunitions, it is 
important to establish whether the affected objects were civilian or military. In 
obedience to article 52(1) of API civilian objects are all objects, which are not 
military objectives. Since the definition of civilian objects is negative, it is 
necessary to test all objects that were attacked against the definition of 
military objectives. 
4.1.2 Assessment	  of	  the	  main	  command	  center	  for	  the	  Georgian	  
operation	  in	  South	  Ossetia	  as	  a	  military	  objective	  	  
Because of the ever-changing circumstances during the armed conflict, each 
potential and desired to be attacked object must be tested against the 
definition in article 52(2) of API. So, the first object to be tested is the main 
command center for the Georgian operation in South Ossetia. The temporary 
military command post as well as command center is a military objective by 
nature.237 The purpose of this center was the intention of the Georgian 
commanders to use it in the future for coordination, communication and 
planning of military operations in South Ossetia. The use of the center, which 
is concerned with its present function,238 matched its purpose. With other 
words the command center was created with the purpose to be used as a 
military command post and was actually used as intended. When it turns to 
the center’s location, it is also contributes to the fact that the center was a 
military objective. The center was located in the city of Gori, which is 35 km 
from Tskhinvali – the capital of South Ossetia. Thus, location of the center in 
Gori, which is so close to the South Ossetia, was strategically important for 
the Georgian military operations there. There is unfortunately no correct 
information where exactly towards the main square it was located.  
The next part of the test that has to be analysed is whether the center’s nature, 
use, purpose or location makes an effective contribution to military action. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 see the list of military objectives in Dinstein 2010:96 and UK Manual 2004, 5.4.4 
238 Dinstein 2010:99 
	   39	  
Military action is meant in generally, and not connected to a specific military 
operation.239 The nature of the center makes an effective contribution to 
military action because the center is used directly by armed forces. Since also 
the purpose, location and use of the center provide both administrative and 
logistical support for Georgian troops to plan and coordinate their military 
operations in South Ossetia against Russians, which has meaning for the 
results of the whole conflict, these categories make an effective contribution to 
Georgian’s military actions. The center provides an effective military 
contribution to Georgian’s military action because of its relevant military use 
and military importance. Furthermore, it is significant to test whether a total or 
partial destruction or neutralization of the command center as military 
objective, in the circumstances ruling at the time, would offer a definite military 
advantage.  
Whether a definite military advantage would result from an attack must be 
judged in the context of the military advantage expected from the specific 
military operation of which the attack is a part of the whole operation.240 It is 
unknown whether Russian troops were launching a special operation when 
the center was attacked. However, it is obviously that by attacking the main 
command center for Georgian operation in the South Ossetia, Russian troops 
intended to get a military advantage in form of neutralization of the place 
where the future operations against Russian and South Ossetian troops were 
planned and coordinated. This attack would contribute to the superiority of 
Russians in the context of the whole armed conflict, since the center was the 
main one. Thus, the military advantage that Russians anticipated to get was 
definite and concrete. The fact that the military advantage obtained from the 
attack would be immediate and military, and neither political nor economical, 
strengthens the assessment of the main command center as a military 
objective.  
The armed conflict between Georgian and Russian military troops has already 
begun, when the command center was attacked on August 12. So at the time 
of the attack there were circumstances that were typical for the hostilities. 
However, as the eyewitnesses confirmed all Georgian troops had left the city 
of Gori by the evening of August 11. Thus, there is a high possibility that the 
command center was already empty (without any armed forces) at the 
moment of the attack – August 12. It is also logically to believe that since all 
Georgian troops retreated, the command center did not contain any materials 
on planning, communication and coordination of military operations either. 
With the changes of the circumstances of hostilities, the military advantage of 
a particular military objective also changes. At the moment of the attack on 
August 12, the purpose and use of the center possibly were missing, and 
consequently the effective contribution of the center was less.  
However, the nature and location of the center remained unchangeable even 
if the center was empty. Since the definitive military advantage must be 	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offered in the circumstances ruling at the time241, it is therefor doubly whether 
the command center presented a concrete and definitive military advantage at 
the moment of the attack by Russians. However, it is the military decision-
maker who must receive all available information and assess on the basis of 
that information. If the available information leads him to believe that the 
attack of a particular military objective will offer the advantage that he seeks, 
that will be enough.242 There are no any details, on which information the 
commander who decided to launch the attack against the center has received 
in advance, especially whether he knew that Georgian troops have retreated 
or not. Thus, it is difficult to calculate 100 percent the military advantage that 
was expected from the center’s attack. But since the decision-maker cannot 
operate on the basis of absolute certainty about available information,243 the 
military advantage from destruction or neutralization of the command center 
was definite though. Thus, the two central tests for an object to become a 
military objective – effective contribution to military action and presence of a 
definite military advantage as the result of destruction, capture of 
neutralization, are satisfied. So, the main command center for the Georgian 
operation in South Ossetia defines as a military objective and thus legal target. 
4.1.3	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Russian	  and	  Georgian	  military	  troops	  as	  
military	  objectives	  
	  
Military troops or armed forces are typical military objectives because that 
consists of combatants.244 They are by nature, use and purpose and their 
location within the hostilities, have military value, and thus make an effective 
contribution to military action. The each adversary by destroying, capture or 
neutralization of the enemy armed forces would get a definite military 
advantage. 
Since the eyewitnesses repeatedly confirmed that Georgian troops were 
retreating from Gori, Ruisi, Variani, Akhaldaba and Tskhinvali, it is significant 
to clarify whether retreating troops are military objectives. Since retreating 
troops are military troops that consists of combatants, so they under usual 
circumstances would be military objective.  
The only way for combatants to immunize themselves from further attacks is 
to surrender and thereby become hors de combat.245 Thus, the both Russian 
and Georgian military troops were military objectives. 
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4.1.4	  Assessment	  of	  the	  main	  square	  of	  Gori	  and	  the	  public	  square	  in	  
the	  center	  of	  Variani	  as	  military	  objectives	  
These two objects will be assessing together because of their similar nature 
and use. A public square as such is not a military objective by nature, 
because it has not any essential characteristics that effectively contribute to 
military action, so an attack on the square could provide a military advantage. 
The intended future use of the two squares was about to use them as a public 
place for gathering of people. And indeed, they were used as a public 
common place, where all inhabitancies had a possibility to get a humanitarian 
relief, meet each other and received the latest news. On the morning of 
August 12 several dozens civilian (at least 40 civilians) had gathered on the 
central square in Gori as they usually did. The same was on the public square 
in Variani, where dozen civilians including children came as usually on the 
morning of August 8. There were not any military munitions standing on the 
squares, otherwise the eyewitnesses would confirmed the opposite. Neither 
there were any combatants nor police units on the square at the days of 
attacks – August 12 in Gori and August 8 and 12 in Variani, because all 
Georgian troops and police units have left both Gori and Varian during the 
previous nights. Thus, the both squares had neither military purpose nor 
military function. The location of the squares in the middle of cities did not 
make any effective contribution to military action since these two objects had 
no military importance and thus, could not “offer limitations on the adversary’s 
tactical options”.246  
Thus, the squares as objects by their nature, purpose, location or use do not 
make any effective contribution to military action. Since there is a certain 
degree of duplication between the two cumulative criteria of the test for 
qualification as a military objective247, the absent of effective contribution to 
military action will automatically lead to lack of military advantage by 
destruction or neutralization of the object. Consequently, the squares as 
objects do not satisfy the criteria of the test, and were not military objectives at 
the moment of the attacks. The two public squares in Gori and Variani thus, 
were civilian objects and could not be made the object of the attacks 
according to article 52(1) of API. 
4.1.5	  Assessment	  of	  the	  affected	  by	  cluster	  munitions	  civilians'	  homes	  
and	  agricultural	  filed	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  Gori	  -­‐Tskhinvali	  corridor	  
south	  of	  the	  South	  Ossetian	  administrative	  border	  and	  in	  the	  region	  
north	  of	  the	  Gori	  district	  as	  military	  objectives	  	  
The civilians' homes in Gori, Variani, Ruisi and Akhaldaba are only a part of 
nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor that have been affected 
by Russian cluster munitions’ strikes. The civilians' homes in Brotsleti, Ditsi, 
Kvemo Khviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, Zemo Khviti and 
Zemo Nikozi have been affected by Georgian cluster munitions’ strikes. The 	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agricultural fields as usual are adjacent with the civilian homes and backyard, 
because the civilians in those regions live because of harvest and cattle 
breeding. These areas constitute together populated civilians areas. 
Civilians' homes are typical civilian objects because they usually inhabited by 
civilians, so their purpose and use do not usually have any military importance. 
The hoses were situated in or near the towns and villages in typical populated 
areas. The eyewitnesses stated that there were no Georgian troops neither in 
Gori, Variani, Ruisi nor Akhaldaba at the days of attacks. So the possibility 
that some military forces could be inside some houses disappears. The same 
statements were made according to the absent of Russian troops in Tirdznisi 
and Shindisi villages. So, the nature, purpose, location and use of the 
civilians' homes and fields could not and did not contribute effectively to 
military action.  
A civilian object may however become a military objective by changing its 
use/purpose and/or location and thus, provide an effective contribution to 
military action. A house for example, can be used as munitions storage and 
consequently become a military objective; an agricultural field can be used as 
a military airfield. But, there must be a distinctive feature turning an object into 
a military objective.248 Since there were no evidence of such or similar use, 
and because of the impossibility that all affected by both parties' military 
troops houses in all mentioned villages and towns could be used with the 
military purpose, there is a lack of effective contribution to military action. It is 
also difficult to receive any military advantage by destroying civilians' homes - 
typical civilian objects. Thus, the absent of the two elements of the test on 
becoming a military objective, make the affected civilians' homes and its filed 
in above-mentioned regions civilian objects, which are protected from the 
attacks by international humanitarian and customary law. 
Thus, as the result of both Russian and Georgian cluster munitions strikes not 
only military objectives were attacked, but also civilians and civilian objects in 
populated civilian areas, which violates the basic and fundamental principle of 
international customary and treaty law - principle of distinction between 
civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.  
Since the law of armed conflicts permits to attack only military objective, it 
prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects, despite whether a 
prohibited attack is direct and wilfully, or whether it is indiscriminate. In any 
case the both parties to the conflict has violated the main rule of the conduct 
of hostilities – the protection and respect of civilians and civilian objects. 
However it is significant to analyse whether Russian and Georgian attacks 
were indiscriminate due to chosen by them means and/or methods of warfare 
in and near civilian population. 
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4.2	  Analyse	  of	  the	  attacks	  in	  and	  near	  populated	  civilian	  areas	  as	  
indiscriminate	  	  
Attacks against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited not only when they 
are direct and intentional, but also when they are indiscriminate (indirect). 
Indiscriminate attacks differ from direct attacks against civilians in that the 
attacker is not really trying to harm civilians, but injuring them or damage 
civilian objects, simply because of his absent of concern about it.249 
The article 51(4) and (5) of API provides a fundamental rule within the law of 
targeting – prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The first part of the rule 
concerns the attacks, which are not directed at a specific military objective. 
When analysing whether the attacks launched by Russian and Georgian 
troops were directed only at military objectives, the more facts and evidence 
should be available. The review of the reports made by HRW and Dutch 
investigative commission do not provide comprehensive data on whether the 
both Russian and Georgian military troops directed their weapons exclusively 
on such military objectives as the enemy military troops or on the main 
command center (for Russian). So without having more facts on how their 
“weapons were actually fired or used”250 it will be legally incorrect to finalize 
whether the provision 4(a) of article 51 of API has been breached.  
When it turns to the second sub rule on prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in 
article 51 – 4(b) and (c), the main attention is turned on the weapons’ type 
that is used and on the way in which such weapons are used.251 Before 
launching any attack military decision-maker must firstly consider the 
character and nature of chosen for the attack weapon and secondly the way 
in which such weapon will be used. Even if the chosen target is legitimate 
military objective, such target may not be attacked by the weapon that cannot 
be directed exclusively on that target, and as result is not able to distinguish 
between civilians and civilian objects.252 
Under Georgia’s Criminal Code, “launching an indiscriminate attack…is a 
crime.253 The Russian Federation’s Military Manual also prohibits the 
launching of an indiscriminate attack.254 So both Russia and Georgia prohibit 
indiscriminate attacks, but none of them identify what indiscriminate attacks 
are.   
The both Russian and Georgian militaries have employed cluster munitions as 
a mean of warfare during the conflict. Cluster munitions attacks affected not 
only such military objectives as the enemy troops and the command military 
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center, but civilians and their homes and agricultural field, together with other 
civilian objects in and near populated civilian areas.  
Cluster munitions’ use is prohibited by Convention on Cluster Munitions.255 
Neither Russian nor Georgia has participated in negotiations during the 
development of the Convention; they have not signed it either. So, they are 
not obligated to fulfil the conditions of the Conventions. However, Protocol V 
on Explosive Remnants of War 2003, an additional instrument to the CCW, 
applies also to cluster munitions, more precisely to cluster munitions that did 
not explode on impact. Russia has officially ratified the Protocol three weeks 
prior to the use of cluster munitions in the armed conflict. Georgia in its turn 
agreed to be bound in December 2008. The Protocol’s obligations entered 
into the force for these states only 6 months after the ratification. 256 It means 
that at the moment of the conflict both Russia and Georgia have not been 
technically bounded by the Protocol yet. Even so, they both should respect 
the obligations of the Protocol and refrain from the employment of such 
restricted mean of warfare as cluster munitions during the conflict. 
The Protocol V on ERW together with the CCM emphasize the nature and 
character of cluster munitions, which when applying especially in or near 
civilian population cannot be precisely targeted at specific military objective. 
This fact is also confirmed repeatedly in different Human Rights Watch 
reports.257 The experts of the organization as well as many lawyers worldwide 
agree that when cluster munitions are used in or near civilian areas, collateral 
civilian damage is extremely difficult to avoid.258 This is because of the 
unguided character of submunitions, so they cannot be guided towards a 
single target, together with their wide-area effect. They merely affect a 
substantial area without any limits to one concrete military target.259  
ICTY Trial Chamber in the Martic case in 2007 made the decision that firing 
non-guided rockets with cluster munitions in the populated civilian area 
constitute an indiscriminate attack.260 
The two regions where Russia and Georgia have employed cluster munitions 
as a mean of warfare - the region in the Gori -Tskhinvali corridor south of the 
South Ossetian administrative border and the region north of the Gori district, 
are populated civilian areas. The evidence shows inter alia that Russian AO-
2.5RTM submunitions usually	  used for neutralization troops were found on the 
public square and many homes of Variani, in backyards in Akhaldaba. The 
submunitions of Russian 9N210 submunitions were found in many backyards 
of Ruisi, in a garden outside of Kvemo Khviti and in 100 meters behind a 
school in Zemo Nikozi. The central square of the city of Gori was attacked by 	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Russian SS26 cluster weapon. The evidence also shows that Georgian M-85 
submunitions were found inter alia on the edge of Shidisi, in the middle of 
Tirdznisi.  
The mentioned types of submunitions are usually dropped together with other 
submunitions (from 30 up to 108 in each rocket or bomb). Thus, the types of 
cluster munitions that have been employed in and near the populated areas 
have a dispersion character, in addition to general difficulty to guide them 
precisely. The strength of characteristics of the used types of cluster 
munitions and the facts of found submunitions in and near populated civilian 
areas, lead to conclusion that chosen means of warfare were not capable to 
target exclusively the military targets, and consequently distinguish between 
combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilians objects. 
To comply with the discrimination rule stated in API, the particular weapon 
must be capable to be directed at a specific military objective, and their effects 
must be capable of limitation, as the rule of distinction requires.261 Thus, the 
both Russian and Georgian attacks with employment of cluster munitions as 
means of warfare were indiscriminate and breached the rule on prohibition of 
indiscriminate attacks, stated in article 51(4)(b) and (c) of API, and as 
consequence the fundamental principle of distinction. 
Indiscriminate attacks cause in practice collateral civilian damage when are 
used in and near populated civilian areas.262 If the expected collateral civilian 
damage during an attack would be excessive in relation to military advantage 
that is anticipated, the attack would be disproportionate. Since the both 
Russian and Georgian attacks caused incidental losses and injures to civilians, 
together with destruction and damage to civilian objects, they have to be 
tested against the military advantage that was expected from those attacks in 
order to indicate whether such attacks were disproportionate, and breached 
the rule of proportionality, stated in article 51(5)(b) of API. 
 
4.3	  Analyse	  of	  the	  attacks	  in	  and	  near	  populated	  civilian	  areas	  as	  
disproportionate	  	  
Excessive collateral damage is not the same as any damage. Some incidental 
injury and/or damage would definitely be compatible with the principle of 
proportionality.263 But it depends on the anticipated military advantage in an 
attack. Therefore the two elements of the rule – expected excessive collateral 
damage and anticipated concrete and direct military advantage must be 
weight against each other at the same time before the launching an attack. 
There is no any data in the reports264 that shows whether a particularly 
military operation has been planned with the detailed deliberation of the 	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military advantage versus civilian losses that might be occurred. However, 
from the facts that are available, it can be assumed that the enemy military 
troops were the military objectives for both Russian and Georgian troops, 
destruction of which would offer a direct and concrete military advantage to 
each party. In addition, it can be assumed that the main command center was 
a military objective for Russians and would give them a definite military 
advantage by the destruction. Furthermore, the Russian and Georgian 
commanders had to calculated the collateral civilian damage expected when 
launching the cluster munitions attacks in and near populated civilian areas, 
and contrast it against anticipated definite military advantage prior to each 
attack that have been launched during the conflict.  
Nevertheless, it is hard to calculate the degree of risk of collateral damage 
with 100 percent precision265, the fact that attacks were launched in and near 
populated civilian areas and with application of cluster munitions, makes the 
possibility that such attacks would cause excessive collateral damage, 
already during the planning, colossal. The fact that incorrectness and wide 
dispersal pattern of the cluster submunitions create problems under the rule of 
proportionality during the use in or near populated areas266 must be taken into 
account. Cluster munitions attacks in or near populated areas are particularly 
likely to be disproportionate because of the unpredictable amount of civilian 
casualties each attack cause.267 The ICTY concluded in Blaskic case that by 
strong use of heavy weapon at the villages inhabited mostly by civilians, the 
consequences are out of all proportion to military necessity, and many 
civilians would automatically be killed and their homes destroyed.268 Indeed, 
as the result of Russian attacks 11 civilians were killed and 46 injured. 
Georgian attacks have caused death of 4 civilians and injured 8. A lot of 
civilian homes and other civilian objects were destroyed as well.  
Besides, the facts269 that none of military forces were situated in those towns 
and villages and uncertainty on how far from villages they actually were during 
the Russian and Georgian attacks, make the location and exactly presence of 
the enemy military troops as military objectives quite vague and unclear for 
the adversary. Therefore, the military advantage that both Russian and 
Georgian have expected to receive by destroying such military objectives was 
incorrect and indirect. Additionally, it should be underlined that since the 
military objectives were unclear, commanders had to consider the use of 
alternative means of warfare, especially when launching the attacks in and 
near populated areas.  
Furthermore, cluster munitions leave behind a disproportionately large 
amount of unexploded submunitions. Since there were used cluster 
munitions as the main weapons, the long-term civilian harm caused by 
unexploded submunitions and duds should be also taken into account for 	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calculation of excessive collateral damage. 
Georgia has used M-85 submunitions that were without self-destruction 
mechanism. As Human Right Watch researches have established, the 
Georgian submunitions landed on villages because of a massive failure; many 
of the duds in the Gori area were in unarmed position. The actual failure rate 
was between 5 to 10 percent, which was 1.3 to 2.3 percent more than 
reported in testing. In addition, Norwegian People’s Aid confirmed that the 
employed by Russians 9N210s submunitions had 35 percent dud rate; in 
addition the amount of Russian unexploded submunitions that were found in 
the populated areas indicated high potential injures in the future.270 Thus, both 
Russian and Georgian employed cluster munitions in the attacks, caused 
particular danger and future casualties and damage for civilians whose main 
source of living were harvest, carrying out farming and grazing activities, 
because of the unexploded submunitions and duds lying on the ground. 
Both Russian and Georgian commanders had to foresee not only the directly 
expected civilian harm as the result of launching the attacks in and near the 
towns and villages, but also the long-term aftereffects caused by the cluster 
munitions use as a part of calculation of expected collateral civilian damage. 
The summarized collateral civilian damage of both Russian and Georgian 
attacks considers as excessive in relation to the military advantage that was 
anticipated by each party. Thus, the attacks launched in and near populated 
civilian areas in the region in the Gori -Tskhinvali corridor south of the South 
Ossetian administrative border and in the region north of the Gori district, 
were disproportionate because of violation of article 51(5)(b) of API. 
4.3.1	  Assessment	  of	  the	  attacks	  in	  and	  near	  populated	  civilian	  areas	  
in	  conformity	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  precautionary	  obligation	  
	  
In order to avoid or at least minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian 
properties, and thus prevent indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks 
during the military hostilities, the precautionary measures must be employed 
by both Russia and Georgia commanders during the conflict. The rule of 
precautionary obligation is the dual component of both the fundamental 
principles of distinction and proportionality. 
Before the launching every attack both parties’ commanders had to verify that 
the targets that were planning to be attacked were neither civilians nor civilian 
objects. This legal obligation is significantly important when the hostilities take 
place in and near populated civilian areas. Since the obligation to do 
everything possible to protect civilians is of crucial importance before every 
military attack, both Russian and Georgian military commanders had to select 
the optimal target – one that will minimize collateral civilian damage271; or at 
least to ensure that the villages were empty together with the exact 
determination of the enemy military troops’ location as possible military 	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objectives. Unfortunately, there is no any data in the reports272 that shows 
whether military commander did everything feasible for verification that the 
objectives to be attacked were exclusively military objectives. 
However, the conclusions of the legal assessment of the attacks against 
proportionality rule, show that collateral civilian damage was excessive in 
comparison to anticipated military advantage during the cluster munitions 
attacks. Hence, by choosing cluster munitions as means of attacks in and 
near populated civilian areas, both Russia and Georgia disregarded the 
obligation to take all feasible precautions in the choice of mean and methods 
of attack in order to avoid or at least minimize collateral civilian damage. Such 
significant factors affecting incidental loss or damage, as the proximity of 
civilians or civilian objects in the vicinity of the target, or other inhabited 
objects or zones, or the possible release of hazardous substances as a result 
of the attack; conditions affecting the accuracy of targeting; what weapon 
were available; timing273 (especially for the attacks at the public squares of 
Gori and Variani on the morning) have been neglected to be considered by 
Russian and Georgian commanders. Otherwise, with taking into consideration 
such factors, cluster munitions would not be chosen as means of the 
launched attacks in and near populated civilian areas.  
In order to avoid collateral civilian damage, both Russian and Georgian 
commanders had to chosen alternative means and methods of warfare, or 
cancel or suspend the attacks. However, the attacks were launched, and 
violated thus the obligation to refrain from launching an attack expected to be 
in breach of the principle of proportionality.274  
When it regards the obligation to remove the civilian population from the 
vicinity of military objectives275 as well as to give an effective advance 
warning276, so the civilians can leave a locality before it is attacked, it is 
unfortunately difficult to establish whether such required precautionary 
measures have been made by Russian and Georgian commanders. The 
eyewitnesses have stated that some villages were almost empty. However, 
being familiar with the mentality of the people in Georgia, it can be assumed 
that those who left their homes did it on their own and by whole families, 
rather than receiving any advance warning from Russian or Georgian 
commanders. 
Thus, the facts that both Russian and Georgian attacks with employment of 
cluster munitions as means of warfare in and near populated areas, were 
indiscriminate and disproportionate, are also confirmed by the evidence that 
neither Russia nor Georgia have taken all feasible precautions in the choice of 
the means of attacks in order to avoid civilian losses. They have also 
disregarded the obligation to refrain from launching or further cancellation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 facts are from the reports of HRW and Dutch investigative commission 
273 UK Military Manual 5.32.5, 5.32.6 
274 API article 57(2)(a)(iii) 
275 API article 58(a) 
276 API article 57(2)(c) 
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attacks expected to be in breach of the principle of proportionality. The both 
Russia and Georgia have violated the rule of precautionary obligation, 
especially articles 57(2)(a)(ii) and (iii), 57(2)(b) of API. 	  
4.4	  Analyse	  of	  the	  indiscriminate	  and	  disproportionate	  attacks	  
in	  conformity	  with	  the	  balance	  between	  principles	  of	  military	  
necessity	  and	  humanity	  
 
The attacks in and near populated civilian areas caused excessive damage to 
civilians in comparison to anticipated military advantage, and resulted into 
disproportionality of the balance between military necessity and humanity.  
Civilians have been inflicted suffering in that has not been actually necessarily 
because of the absent of definite and concrete military advantage. The 
collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects were excessive in 
comparison with the military advantage that has been expected. The 
legitimate military objectives should been attacked with employment of 
alternative means and methods of warfare, thus avoiding the violation of the 
basic rules and customs of law of war that prohibit to employment of weapons 
that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.277  
The both states have also neglected to consider the chosen means and 
methods of warfare in conformity with the principle of humanity, as the 
Martens Clause requires.278 Thus, the actually chosen types of means of 
warfare have caused the impossibility to confirm with the obligation to protect 
civilians from and during the attacks and as result caused indiscriminate and 
disproportionate attacks. Thus, both Russian and Georgia failed to practice 
the basic immunity for civilians and civilian objects, as justified by principle of 
humanity. 
As the consequences of being indiscriminate and disproportionate, the attacks 
have destroyed the balance between performing military necessity through 
the lawfully limited means and methods of warfare, and the adherence of 
humanity. By overstepping the balance, the parties have violated both 
principle of military necessity and humanity. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 API article 35, Hague Convention IV 1907 art. 32(e) 
278 Kolb, Hyde 2008: 62-63 
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Conclusion	  	  
The International Court of Justice took attention and cautioned in the Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that “states must never make civilians the 
object of attack, and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”.279 	  
Cluster munitions are not nuclear weapon, however it is an area weapon and 
as a consequence are truly difficult to be directed on specific military target 
near or in populated area. The additional facts that cluster munitions are 
prohibited by the CCM, and that their unexploded submunitions are specially 
restricted by Protocol V to CCW, the existence of which both Russia and 
Georgia were aware, did not stop the parties from choosing and employing 
the cluster munitions as the means of the attacks in and near populated areas. 
By not applying only lawfully limited means and methods of warfare, both 
states did not uphold the principle of military necessity. 
Despite the fact that Georgian cluster munitions attacks caused much fewer 
civilians’ casualties then Russian, both states’ cluster munitions attacks in and 
near populated areas were indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. Both 
Russian280 and Georgia281 recognize the prohibition of indiscriminate and 
disproportionate attacks. However, it did not stop them from making civilians 
objects of attacks, and as the consequence inflict the unnecessary suffering to 
the civilian population and damage to civilian objects by employment the 
cluster munitions as the prohibited means of the attacks in and near 
populated areas in the Gori-Tskhinvali region.  
By not protected the civilians and by causing unnecessarily suffering, the both 
states breached not only the principle of distinction and proportionality, but 
also neglected to adhere within the principle of humanity. The parties have not 
only breached the rules of distinction and proportionality, but also showed an 
irresponsible ignore for the customary rules of targeting. Thus, by violating the 
fundamental principles of armed conflicts and customary rules of warfare, the 
employment of cluster munitions as the means of warfare in and near 
populating areas was unlawful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 1996 para 78 
280 Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL 2001 §7, §26, §54 
281 Georgia’s Criminal Code 1999 article 413(d) 
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